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RATES: RATIOCINATION OR
RO U LETTE*
JAMES B. SMITH**
I
The problem of the public utility rate probably is one of the most
serious in our scheme of government. Its solution seems to measure
whether we can justify to the world the competence and virtue we
profess for it. The enormous spendthrift drain on official time and
expense is legion.' At stake is not only the system of private property
in its several significances but also the organization and process of the
scheme of government which is involved in the confusion of the ju-
dicial and legislative process contrary to the doctrine of departmentali-
zation. These are hazards of maladministration by the engineer and not
defects in the engine.
When we reassociate these processes, the machinery of government
will be ready to digest the grist of rates.
II
We are looking only at the list of industries usually captured in com-
mon understanding as public utilities. It is not that these are any differ-
ent than other private properties but only that the condition of com-
pulsory application of the owner's profit to the consumer's relief has
been justified by the facts. It is for simplification for discussion here
that the easy list of transportation, light, water, etc., is made exclusive
so as to escape the companion problem of whether new categories ever
can be added,' or, once captured, can escape. 3 We need the feel of this
accordion pleat folded in the cloth of the Constitution through Block v.
Hirs14 to Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair5 and back again in order to grasp
the full teaching of Munn v. Illinois6 that we cannot enter through gov-
ernment unless we have to do so as disclosed by the jurisdictional facts.
That Munn gives jurisdiction only to the extent of the necessity is made
clear in the Railroad Comnn Cases.' We may vaccinate but we
cannot enslave. When the public servitude of entry is exhausted, con-
fiscation begins.
* Around and around the little ball goes, and where it stops, nobody knows.
**Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law; B.S., National
University (1924); LL.B., University of Kansas (1926); J.S.D., Yale Uni-
versity (1927) ; valuation attorney, Interstate Commerce Commission (1931-
1932) ; valuation expert counsel, Public Utilities Commission of the District
of Columbia (1932); member, New York, Kansas, American, Federal Bar
Associations; life member, American Law Institute.
'See Smith, The Reality of the Public Utility Rate Base, 67 DIcK. L. REv. 83(1962).
2See pending proposed national legislation for a national milk price control.
3 See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
4256 U.S. 135 (1921) ; cf. Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz. 241 U.S. 252 (1916).
5 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
6 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
7 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886).
This is the foundation for any rate making. No one needs to have
explained that if the clear-profit top of the income from his business
is decreed to his buyer, his business is not worth as much as if it were
immune. At the same time, no longer in contest is the recognition that
the public utility no longer is free to exploit the market through un-
limited profits. The problem of rates is to administer that division.
Starkly before us is the question of whether or not this form of gov-
ernment has the competency. If it appears that it does not, the house
of government is some kind of a prison and not a cathedral with its
heaven-reaching towers of liberty, for it is the security of the indi-
vidual in his person and his property that has given it the latter char-
acterization. There cannot be an argument that if we cannot do what
we must do, it is we who bury ourselves. If it costs eight years just to
get a rate case ripe for the trial of the federal questions, we are not
doing very well. There is no purpose here to speculate on alternates.
I do not care what they might be because I am sure that none that has8
or can be suggested has the merit of the present. To go on, I conclude
that we want to keep the private property institution.
This brings us to appraisal of the process of determination of the
level above which the income of the public utility is excessive.
III
The administrative commission was the consequence of the burden
which the complexity of the problem placed upon the primary legisla-
ture. It had neither the time nor the organization to administef the pro-
gram. We may pass the issues of validity of the employment of the
commission on the challenge of delegation together with its side issues.
The commission, by the time of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,
was an established institution made necessary by the circumstances.
What probably confounded the development was the failure to
appreciate that if I had a constitutionally secure starting point, I was
entitled to the due process of law for the determination if my conduct
had placed me beyond the line of immunity. Granger legislators sup-
posed that when the utility was given a hearing before their commis-
sion, its decree could be declared ultimate. The teaching of Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota9 and ICC v. Brimson ° is so great that
its significance may not be appreciated. We have noted the recognition
in the Railroad Comm'n Cases" that the floor under rates is con-
stitutionally woven. It therefore followed that, the legislative not being
sovereign, the will of the sovereign limiting its action raised a justiciable
8 See notes 25 and 68 infra. Once the classification is established, the problem
of information or non-disclosure leaves. Cf. Smith, The Privilege of Silence
and the Legislative Process, 41 GEO. L. J. 330 (1953).
9 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
10 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
11 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886).
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issue. Finality in legislative declaration would be a denial of due
process' because the meaning of the Constitution is involved and that
is an issue of law for the consideration of the judicial power. Prentis
v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.' and Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust
Co.14 demonstrate that ruses to short-circuit the judicial power to pass
finally in independent judgment on questions of law and fact will not
satisfy constitutional assurance against arbitrary legislative-executive
dooming.
This casts the challenge to our scheme of government. Is the delay
inherent to judicial review so great that the cost of security is more
than it is worth?
IV
The reason that it is necessary here to identify constitutional limita-
tion through departmentalization is that the what or why or how of
rates would be immaterial if some subordinate official has power,
in a self-originating imperialism, to say finally what is the property
ownership. "Whether their property was taken unconstitutionally de-
pends upon the evaluation of the property, the income to be derived
from the proposed rate and the proportion between the two-pure
matters of fact.... [A]l1 their constitutional rights, we repeat, depend
upon what the facts are found to be."'" To stage the drama of rates,
we must seek as much identity as possible of whose is stage and theater,
and who works the lights. These must be pressed into focus and dwelt
with until there is sort of a feeling of tangible realism. This is so im-
portant because we shall see that in this nicety of division is found the
responsibility of decision, and, somehow in the ways of man, this casts
the die. We must not take too long here with the construction of the
stage. It already is built. Elsewhere 6 the political precepts of depart-
mentalization are demonstrated in focus. The evolution of the judicial
power as the instrument of preservation of constitutional security
is developed to demonstrate that the correlation essential to secured
efficiency in the rate-making process also must be incorporated by
reference.'7 What we want to point out is the area of interaction and
the independent sufficiency of each, recognizing that both the commis-
sion and the court are instruments of the same principal.
What is so important here to visualize and hold in working per-
spective is that, in this juxtaposition, it is fundamental that the legisla-
tive responsibility of decision of the commission does not shift from
1 ICC v. Brimson, supra note 10.
13 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
14 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
15 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra note 13, at 228.
16 See Smith, The Treaty Process in the American Representative System, 7
KAN. L. R-v. 31 & 138 (1958).
17 See Smith, Relief from Ultra Vires Governmental Action, 42 MARQ. L. REV.
429 (1959).
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the legislative to the judicial power in the auditing of the order of the
commission. "We do not sit as a general appellate board of revision
for all rates in the United States. We stop with considering whether it
clearly appears that the Constitution of the United States has been in-
fringed ;"1s and, in determining whether it has been infringed, "we do
not feel bound to re-examine and weigh all the evidence . . . or to
proceed according to our independent opinion as to what were proper
rates. It is enough if we cannot say it was impossible for a fair-minded
board to come to the result which was reached."' 9 Contentions that more
is required by other cases are dissolved by the Court: "They simply
reflect a policy [20] ... that administrative determination of 'jurisdiction-
al facts' should not be final but subject to judicial review."21 That judicial
review is exhausted with a trial (or auditing) of the trial in the com-
mission in accord with the traditional relation. The responsibility of
decision does not shift to the judicial as to require a "new" or retrial
in the court. "It is now settled that a utility has no right to relitigate
factual questions on the ground that constitutional rights are in-
volved." 2 2 We should now concern ourselves with what must be done to
meet the adjudicatory function in the commission.
V
The books bulge with all sorts of discussions of the previous points.
What concerns us now is missed there and even glossed over by the
courts. It is so important to our rate problem because it will disclose
the traditional and clear us from an indictment of novelty. I do not
seek to invent anything. For one reason, the element of alarm is avoided
if we move under the prognosis of tradition; but more importantly,
what has been evolved and tested by the practice of experience seems
a better plan than any that has been suggested for substitution or that
I can conceive. We come to it.
The basic aspects of the rate hearing involve the commission in both
judicial and legislative functions. For a while, the zeal of many,
transcending the Grangers, was expressed in plans to put the rate
process in the judiciary. Muskrat v. United States23 and Prentis4 made
it clear this was impossible. 5 The Court explains this in Reagan.2 6
It is captured in the division of function for the states in ianvrin v.
Revere Water Co.' 7 Whatever invitation there may be to somehow
18 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 446 (1903).
19 Id. at 441.
20 Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
2 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958).
22 Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 348 (1951).
23 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
24 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra note 13.
25 See generally Smith, The Judicial Function in the Legislative Bodies, 27 VA.
L. REv. 417 (1941).
26 Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., supra note 14.
27 174 Mass. 514, 55 N.E. 381 (1899).
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capture the judicial phases into the third article type tribunal, it proves
too much. The complexity of the practice and the need for the con-
tinuous supervision which require the primary legislature to infudate
the rate-making order to the commission would cause the judiciary to
lose its tenuous appropriateness of jurisdiction. The gap in the ad-
ministration of government compelled the employment of the commis-
sion and thus expressed the public policy of putting the place of trial
in the commission. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.28 consoli-
dates what was made clear in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton
Oil Co. 29 and now confirmed in Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry. 30
This seems to settle beyond further contention that the primary juris-
diction and responsibility of decision are placed finally and fully in the
commission. 31
This brings into perspective the two features of the genesis of the
body politic and the finality of the rate order.
VI
Equity came to the judicial process largely to escape the rigidity of
law that process might have the intelligence to serve the necessities of
the situation-an adequate remedy when that was lacking at law. The
commission was necessary for the same reason-a more facile process
to achieve the requirements of the administration of government. An
action before the commission "is not a suit at common law or in the
nature of such a suit. The proceeding is one unknown to the common
law. It is a statutory proceeding." 32 It is inherently equitable for full
relief. Once the power of the commission is established, "to regulate
the relation and to decide the facts affecting it are hardly separable. 33
This brings us to the problem of ripeness.34
VII
Maitland's comment on the transition from forms of action never
was so apropos to the progressing in government habits as in the evolu-
tion of the rate order. The great differential significance is that the
analysis here presented is not some nominal reform in a detail but
is a basic fundamental of the exercise of a process. The first impression
28303 U.S. 41 (1938).
29204 U.S. 426 (1907).
30372 U.S. 658 (1963).
31 Einhorn v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 410 Pa. 636, 190 A. 2d 569, 571 (1963).
32 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937).
33 "A part of the exigency is to secure a speedy and summary administration
of the law and we are not prepared to say that the suspension of ordinary
remedies was not a reasonable provision of a statute reasonable in its aim
and intent." Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921). See also Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 447-48 (1944), and Guthrie Nat'l Bank v.
Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 537 (1899), for authority that the proceeding is "not
in the nature of a suit at common law."
34 Every child knows he can eat green apples, but one bellyfull will teach
him to wait the next time until the acid turns to sugar.
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gives its image to the change. Everything in this world changes as it
matures. Creatures that look like little fishes become frogs. The atten-
tion which satisfies the new-born child will not satisfy her as a candi-
date for motherhood. What is true of the body natural also is true of
the body politic. The image of the rate order published by the act of
the primary legislature was pressed to the extreme and carried forward
to the. rate order of the commission. They are very different. "To
press a juristic principle designed for practical affairs of government
to abstract extremes is neither sound logic nor good sense. And this
Court is under no duty to make law less than good logic and good
sense." 35 The purpose here is to trace that good sense in governmental
function. When its practice ceases to achieve that in practice "it is im-
perative that we consider anew the immunity claimed .... -3r What we
must consider anew is the failure of the application of the fundamental
principle of the equity jurisdiction to the doctrine of departmentaliza-
tion.
When the rate order was an enactment of the primary legislature,
the situation was ripe for judicial review. The legislation was com-
plete. The legislature had washed its hands of the problem and had cast
the matter upon the public trestle board for the parties affected to seek
relief in the judicial power just as it did in any other statute; i.e., a tax
rate for permanent operation. That it might be the works of a hostile
legislature naturally called for the measuring power to say that a rail-
road "is not placed at the mercy of legislative caprice.1' 37 This was
the type of provoking action involved in the two-cent rate which induced
the enactment of the three-judge court in 1910.
That the source of the rate order was ultra vires the judicial was
clear in Reagan.3 s Although the purpose of the analysis was to cast up
the "final act," in comparing the two processes the Court is compelled
to give some recognition to the adjudicatory function of the commis-
sion. The function of hearing and findings is recognized. The commis-
sion's rate-making is distinguished from rate-making by the primary
legislature. 39 Sterling v. Constantin40 makes it clear that constitutionally
35 New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 577 (1946).
36 Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 485 (1939).
3 Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 434 (1913).
33 Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., supra note 14. Protection of the primary
property is a constitutional command, not just an act of grace for measure by
popular favor. See generally Smith, The Constitution and the Conflict of Laws,
27 GEO. L. J. 536 (1939).
39 "The establishment of railroad rates is not like a law that affects private
persons who may never have heard of it until it was passed. It is a matter
of great interest, both to the railroads and to the public, and is watched by
both with scrutinizing care." The railroads went into evidence before the
Commission, and this because "the question that we are considering may be
termed a question of equitable fitness and propriety, and must be answered
on the particular facts." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line 'Co., supra note 13,
at 229-30.
40 287 U.S. 378 (1932) ; see ICC v. Brimson, supra note 10.
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protected rights are entitled to adjudication in hearing or trial and
cannot be doomed. The trial tribunal only can give equitable apportion-
ment as the facts and the law disclose and limit in an investigation
judicial in nature and adjudicated in a final rate order.
This brings us to the congenital character of equity's decree when
the consequence of the ordered change presently cannot be measured
and must be noosed by the light of time.
VIII
The commission's function in the rate hearing is more equity than
is equity, and this is not lost when review is sought from the chan-
cellor. When equity came into the judicial process, law's judgment had
become so ossified, except for the pre-packaged goods, as to be useless.
Law was helpless to assimilate adjustment subsequent to judgment.
Capacity to finish the business was the great contribution and purpose
of equity; i.e., as Mr. Justice Frankfurter phrased it, 1 the court was
under no duty to make law less than good logic and good sense. Public
policy was served by the ending of the contest and the elimination of
multiple litigation. Accounting was its first-born.
This doctrine of continuing jurisdiction applies to a situation in
which the consequence of the present right to relief can only be learned
in the enforcement of the decree. The chancellor must police his own
squib. It is a principle. Prior application is no measuring precedent.
It was devised to escape precedent and it is inherent in the process
with a duty on the court, in accomplishing public policy, to apply it
whenever appropriate. Enumeration of examples is as needless as it is
universal. The novelty of the particular was recognized as immaterial
by Judge Hand in drawing the decree in Shredded Wheat Co. v.
Humphrey Cornell Co.
4 2
4 2See notes 33 and 34 supra.
42250 Fed. 960, 967 (2d Cir. 1918) : "[T]hird, the defendant at the end of six
months may apply to the District Court to be relieved of the second require-
ment, upon showing that after a bona fide trial of all possible expendients it
cannot comply with that provision, except at an expense which would make
it impossible for any continued competition . . . with an assurance of reason-
able profit."
The feature of retention until completion is everywhere: statutes, etc. It
appears in reflection in the general provision of the Judicial Code vesting
equity in the courts. It also has particular enumeration; i.e., 60 Stat. 439
(1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1958).
See the policy of the retention as applied in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), explained in England v. Louisiana State Board
of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). See also Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S.
415, 426 (1934).
The affirmative duty to integrate the final order with trial action to achieve
orderly process also applies even to criminal trials. Benson v. United States,
332 F.2d 288, 291-92 (1964); see Smith, Procedural Judicial Eclecticism, 20
J. KAN. B. A. 21 (1951); cf. NEAL & GOLDBERG, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
ANTITRUST CASES: NOVEL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 621 (1964).
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Indeed, the function of retention until the consequence of the im-
mediate correction or initial relief is disclosed is so much a part of
the equity process that one is the condition of the other.
Here, it is congenital, as always the rate operates to the future and
at the time of entry only the Good Lord can know that. Man, even
judges, must await events of the future to learn and he is obligated
to hold the case open to equate them.43
A casual examination of the nature of the commission's rate order
would be enough to make it clear, even to a stranger to the process,
that equity's doctrine of continuing jurisdiction is galvanic to it.
Ix
The governmental growing-pain anchors memory to the swadling
cloth days of this interdepartmental process. When the primary legis-
lature abandoned its off-spring to prey upon the legally protected prop-
erty of the utility, there was no choice nor corrective means to equity.
It had to bar the barn door by invalidating the statute. This was com-
pounded by the over-reach of federal jurisdiction. In 1875, Congress
for the first time (barring the abortive act of 1801) opened the federal
courts to claims based on a right under the Constitution or laws of the
United States. Therefore, such claims had to be pursued in the state
courts and brought to the Supreme Court of the United States for
review of the federal questions under section 25 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789. In Reagan,44 in 1894, the argument was rejected that suit could
not be brought in the federal trial court to restrain the enforcement of
a state agency order. From then on,45 the injunction was almost auto-
matic upon application, as the act of 1875 was considered as having the
purpose of providing a forum sympathetic of federal rights.4" This was
tempered by the three-judge court acts in 1910 and 1913 and by the
Johnson Act in 1934. This maladjustment was progressive until the
Court searched equity's principles in Railroad Comn'n v. Pullman Co.4 7
When the Court was tussling with Reagan, it saw only the image of a
statute of the primary legislature. It could not fix the rate and it could
not prevent the commission from trying again. This game of shuttle
cock would be a happy solution for unemployed commissioners and
judges if it were not that it is the public interest that is made the buffoon.
This still might be good fun if the sovereign were assured that eventu-
43 The Dodgers will win the pennant. The stock market will keep on going up.
It will rain on Easter. Of course, everyone is familiar with the custodial suit.
Likes v. Likes, 191 Kan. 630, 383 P.2d 983 (1963). In it, the initial rate
order is adjusted to serve the right of return.44 Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., szapra note 14.
45 The practice resembled the labor injunction described in FRANKFURTER &
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).46 Cf. Bacon v. Rutland Ry., 232 U.S. 134 (1914), discussed in Alabama Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., supra note 22.
47312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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ally he would get his crown back for the dunce cap. Under the present
practice, the error may be progressive. The squandering of wealth,
public respect, and time is certain. None is necessary.
Assimilation of recognized practice is enough. If the doctrine of
continuing jurisdiction is allowed to operate, we could give up trying
to do the impossible. When it is not necessary to be foolish, why strive
for it?
X
It might be well to take note as we go along that the state owes all
its population the equal protection of the law. One of the errors of
operation often appears in the methods of the attorney for the com-
mission. Sometimes he imagines he is the prosecutor who, by sending
the accused to the penitentiary, will prove that he is such a statesman
that he should at least be governor.48 The commission speaks for the
state and represents it. 49 It also represents the consumer.5 It is the
duty of its counsel to build a record fair to all and which contains all
the relevant and material evidence, whether one party or another is
interested in that feature of proof. The rate hearing is not an adversary
proceeding to be fattened by tricks. It is a public proceeding where the
purpose is the truth to be arrived at simply, fairly, and promptly by an
impartial tribunal upon all the evidence that should be considered. 51
It is the first rule of all reviewing process that any corrective relief
that may be had before the trial tribunal shall first be exhausted in its
final judgment. It is emphasized in administrative law under the usual
phrasing of exhausting the administrative remedy. It also is disclosed
in Pullman5 " as a principle of equity. Jurisdiction to enjoin cannot be
more clear in a state court than it was there in federal equity. Although
there is nicety of distinction for review,5 3 the simple substance is that
each is a pendent jurisdiction. Neither court has any business in the
case if the trial tribunal has not completed all means available to a just
and final disposition. Many orders issued by government agencies of
all kinds have a dress of finality but may not, for that reason alone,
race off to a court to have it refitted. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United
48 See Campbell v. State, 186 Misc. 586, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 638 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
4 See ICC v. Brimson, supra note 10.
50 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, supra note 18.
51 Only the important is the relevant. Cf. "Miami Beach, Fla. (AP) : 'I was
inch too short to qualify as a Chaplain in World War I,' Francis Cardinal
Spellman, Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York, told the American Legion
convention yesterday .... Cardinal Spellman said he was informed he was
V inch too short for the Navy. 'But they waived that.' Then came an inter-
view with the head chaplain, after which he was rejected 'because I had a
bad disposition.' Cardinal Spellman said he told his superior he had been
rejected because of his height, but didn't mention the part about the bad
disposition." Kansas City Times, Sept. 11, 1963.52 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., supra note 47.
5 Cf. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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States54 and Myers55 make this clear and Rochester Telephone Corp.
v. United States58 confirms it.
The importance of Rochester is not that it is running troika as the
unhitched third horse. There is no novelty in it any more than the re-
evaluation in Graves v. O'Keefe.5 7 It does no t reverse but only confirms
and distinguishes. The process is as new as the concept of a cause of
action with its elements of injury, substance, and time. If I have no
injury apart from the common, whether you call it public or private
nuisance or a rule of administrative law,58 I have no cause of action.
It is one thing to allow the individual to call government to task when
he has some good reason of his own to protest the manner of the ad-
ministration of public affairs and quite another when he undertakes to
be his brother's keeper.5 Rochester allows that part of Reagan which
is vital to survive. It clears the stage for the Isbrandtsen play; namely,
the rate order. It has present form but future operation. As Judge Hand
demonstrated, only observation thereof can disclose whether the pen-
dent function of the judicial power has office. Again and again, the
judicial has no rate-making process; and no one wants it to have any.
All we want is that it exercise the sense that God (or King James)
has given it to induce and restore reason in government.60
XI
This is not recapture, although that does have apologetic merit, any
more than a judgment of remittitur or of increscitur is independent of
the verdict of the jury. 1 Both are associated into and absorbed by the
original act and explain it, all in the same proceeding. The primary
legislature, in granting the charter to the commission, gave it jurisdic-
tion to supervise and police the utility's action so as to serve the public
interest. For our purpose, that is done when the best service is well
-4 300 U.S. 139 (1937).55 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., supra note 28. A multitude of other
cases show this just as well.
56 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
57 306 U.S. 644 (1939) ; see MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916).
5s Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) ; Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503 (1944).
59 Compare People v. Calvar Corp., 286 N.Y. 419, 36 N.E. 2d 644 (1946), where
there is continuing jurisdiction in the commission, with Town of Greenburgh
v. Bobandal Realties, Inc., 10 N.Y. 2d 414, 179 N.E. 2d 702 (1961), Little v.
Young, 299 N.Y. 699, 87 N.E. 2d 74 (1949), Long Island Univ. v. Tappan, 305
N.Y. 985, 144 N.E. 2d 432 (1953), and Village of Euclid v. Amber, 212 U.S.
365 (1926), where orders were final at utterance. This is the identification of
process contributed by Rochester.60 What did the group of natural scientists say when a herd of elephants came
clumping over the hill? They said, "Oh, see the elephants !" What did they
say when a herd of elephants came clumping over the hill wearing dark
glasses? They did not say anything. You see, they couldn't recognize the
elephants in dark glasses.
61 Differences which may appear which are only of form are immaterial to us
as, in any event, the trial of the contested issues is had in equity.
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paid. The issue is not rates. The issue is return. Rates, being the medium
of return, get the attention. The accounting period is the year. All are
articulated in the rate order of the commission over which it exercises
continuing jurisdiction.
The time has come, someone advised, to speak of many things.
For us, they all relate to the rate order. Expressing it in function and
supporting it in supposition cannot be justified in the beauty of the blue
in the "blue sky" of its content. Often, it is easier to explain than to
justify, but here justification is found in the fable of the old hen who
starved to death sitting on the edge of the bushel basket full of wheat
waiting for someone to come and feed her. The problem burst suddenly,
as innocent as a newly-laid egg, in an era of economic and social evul-
sion, and the make-shifts of the kind, made precedents of convenience,
presently are beginning to feel the compulsion of reevaluation that
there may be sense, if not logic, in law.6 2 In this fascinating exploration
it would seem well, like Mr. Justice Cardozo, to reject the Kantian
theory of "purity of will" and follow a more utilitarian approach of
the effect, somewhat after the fashion practiced by Lord Mansfield-to
go to the market place for values money merchants place on its use.63
62 "Things are seldom what they seem. Skim milk masquerades as cream." GIL-
BERT, H.M.S. PINAFORE.63 The caution of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking before the American
Law Institute in 1941, and there repeated by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in
1951, that we must "strengthen the defenses of democracy by commending
to public confidence and esteem the working of institutions of justice in both
state and nation" is most timely now as shown by recent bar studies:
"Hang the Lawyers? From the Des Moines Register: 'The first thing
we'll do, we'll hang all the lawyers,' said one of Jack Cade's rebels in Shake-
speare's play, Henry VI. In spite of many improvements in the law since
then, and endless oratory about the perfections of Anglo-American justice,
some people still have a somewhat similar, but less extreme, feeling of that
kind.
"The Missouri Bar Association has recently published the results of a
2V2-year survey of attitudes toward lawyers and courts among Missourians.
Lawyers and laymen were sounded out by questionnaire and by interview-
and the dismal fact emerged that the more people knew about the system ofjustice, the lower their opinion of it. They thought wealth, social position
and race gave unfair advantage in the law. They thought lawyers charged
too much, and many were suspicious of their honesty and dedication. They
had poor opinions of juries. They felt no great confidence in the fairness
of full-dress trials, and still less confidence in traffic courts.
"All these complaints will be no surprise to alert lawyers. For some time
now, most of the effort to raise standards of justice and legal service have
come from lawvvyers-a small group of them to be sure, but one generally able
to win the backing of bar associations if they keep at it long enough.
"The standard-raisers have accomplished a good deal, though not nearly
enough yet. American law is slow, it is costly, it is uncertain. The "right to
counsel" is meaningless for many Americans in the absence of very consider-
able financial resources. In some places and to some degree, legal aid, court-
appointed attorneys, public defenders and volunteer counsel help toward
making up the gap.
"But from the power of the sword to the power of the purse expresses
a good deal of the progress since Henry VI's time. American courts are still
a sort of trial by combat, but a combat of wits between hired advocates."
Kansas City Times, Aug. 29, 1963; see concluding paragraph of Morgan v.
United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
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XII
The die was cast by Smyth v. Ames.6 4 What was set up as a simple
issue of fact finding since has become such a mushroom-cloud that it
obscures the light of reason and threatens cancer to the marrow of our
government.
It is necessary to see the great importance of the congenital nature
of the commission's continuing jurisdiction against this background.
Originally in the legislature's rate order, that stature was not annealable.
Before the judicial power, it stood unbowed or was aborted. No matter
how erroneous the prophecy proved to be, the judgment winner held
the advantage there obtained.
In Smyth v. Ames, not only were there no facts, but no facts could
be learned. Nevertheless, a fact had to be found. The carrier claimed
everything it could think of and Sir William replied that it was only
what it would cost him to build then, about one-fifth. As investment,
the carrier claimed even more than it spent on anything, whether used
or never used. The Attorney General's claims were fictitious. The car-
rier's claims were found to be a tissue of "injudicious contracts, poor
engineering, unusually high cost of material and rascality on the part
of those engaged in the construction and management of the property."
One side said the egg was made of gold, the other said it was only an
addition of dross. Our purpose here is to pass on from the base and
only to note that the ultimate fact in Smyth v. Ames had to be an
estimate or resultant from all the evidentiary facts. The claims of the
carrier are explainable as self-serving and there seems to be a mental
inclination to assume that all contemporary expenditures are inter-
dependent. It is not true that all costs or risks are incident of the
present function or end in view.6
5
What was spent was some evidence of what should have been spent,
and what it could be built for now was some evidence of what it could
have been built for then. Now, we know what it should have cost or
(4 169 U.S. 466 (1898) ; see discussion in Smith, The Reality of the Public Utility
Rate Base, 67 Dicx. L. REv. 83 (1962) ; Smith, A Constitutional Rate Base,
6 U. CHi. L. RaV. 170 (1939).
65 "Dime Investment Costs Man $600 at Union Station. A pay toilet at the
Union Station was occupied yesterday by a Des Moines man who drove into
Kansas City to attend a meeting of his union.
"He saw a hand sliding under the door and reaching for his trousers. The
hand clutched a billfold which was in the pocket. The man grabbed the
hand. He latched onto the wrist, and there was a tussle which lasted just an
instant.
"Then the intruding hand wrenched itself free, and when it was with-
drawn it carried in it, triumphantly, the man's billfold.
"Very quickly, the man readjusted his clothing and swung out in pursuit.
He was close enough that he even got a departing glimpse of the man with
the wallet, whom he described as white and probably in his 20's. But the
thief was fleet and got away, out through the station lobby somewhere.
"And in that wallet, our unfortunate Des Moines visitor told police, was
$600. Convention. money, trip expenses, incidentals . . . that sort of thing. A
man has to carry money these days." Kansas City Times, Aug. 2, 1963.
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readily can learn it under the continuous policing by the commission of
honest companies. Of course, everything is more or less comparative. 6
The Court went on to point out that the carrier should be well paid for
the money value it had tied up in the plant-to find what rate, as ap-
plied to the base, would do this.
This all seems rather drab in that ordinary men could count gener-
ators, add up their cost, and compute a rate return, but here is the
source of the mysticism which spored from it.67
XIII
It was not to remain for ordinary men; the expert witness becomes
the special species of the genus homo. He can prove the base is "original
cost" as claimed in Smyth v. Ames and, with equal finesse and majesty
of mien, he can prove it is "reproduction new." Oh! That is not con-
fusing! Where he gets his foot on ordinary men is when it comes to
finding what the Court said in passing and because there wasn't any-
thing else before it that income should be equal to comparable risks.
Here, to make it easier to prove his point, he boils finance, economics,
accounting, and engineering into an argot of insouciance to this caco-
phony of claims. Anything that is homotonic is golden to them. All I
want to do is to get about so that, even if it be difficult to walk down
main street with a language that ordinary men can grasp, we still can
be confident that commissioners can. That no longer is true. The im-
portant thing is that the commission be competent to appraise the rele-
vancy and significance of testimony. It would seem that the Court took
the syrup off this professional. "It is unnecessary to analyze the testi-
mony of these witnesses, as it is obviously too conjectural to justify us
in treating the failure to include their estimates as sufficient basis for
a finding of confiscation."6 Quite the contrary, they seem to be the fact.
No one can read the whole record in Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Corm'n 9 and State v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
66 See the testimony on the pending "truth in lending and truth in packaging"
legislation in Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Committee on Com-
mierce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
67 See notes 80 and 81 infra. It would not be so bad to have our barber talk like
a brain surgeon if it were not that he practices it.
68 Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287, 319 (133).
See also Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31 (1962) ; United States
v. Cooper, 277 F. 2d 857 (5th Cir. 1960). There is recent amplification in
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 85 Sup. Ct. 234, 246 (1964): "The expert witness
'will naturally be inclined to go on a fishing expedition in search of anything
which will tend to prove' his retainer's case, 'and . . . for a fee can easily
discover something wrong with any patient-a condition that in prejudiced
medical eyes might have caused the accident.' Their reports are prepared with-
out supervision and 'may either overawe or confuse the jury and prevent a
fair trial.'" It would seem that those who profess the Hippocratic oath would
be no less clean-handed than other fee-experts. Cf. testimony in Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, note 69 infra.69 Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 239 La. 175,
118 So. 2d 372 (1960).
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Co. 70 and not be certain that it is a package of tissue filled with stuff
and nonsense. It seems to be getting more attention that some com-
missioners have allowed themselves to become dependent on the purpose
of the pointed sophistry.71 The practice is as much a perversion of proc-
ess whether it is by one side or the other or both.
XIV
Earlier, much of the time of the expert witness concerned the in-
ventory. Now, the tendency is to confuse income, but whatever the
concern, the profession has become sort of a theology and any criticism
is heresy or apostasy. There always was a natural instinct-2 to advance
70274 Ala. 288, 148 So. 2d 229 (1962).
71 Hanson, Expert Testimony, 49 A.B.A. J. 254 (1963) ; Bell, Utility Appeals-
Review or Rubberst amp, 1963 A.B.A. PuB. UnL. LAW SEcT. ANN. REP.
37. The latter is somewhat a protest of a judgment which incorporates
the fictitious testimony. The curse of this is the merging of the relationship
of the judicial power.
See also Long, Administrative Proceedings: Their Time and Cost Can Be
Cut Down, 49 A.B.A. J. 833 (1963).
"2The practice is not peculiar to public utility claims. It appears in all interests.
See syndicated article of Buchwald, Playing With Dolls is More Expensive
Than It Once Was, Washington, Sept. 26, 1963: "We have nothing against
toy companies. They have a right to live just like everybody else. In their own
way they bring happiness to the hearts of our young ones, and they give
employment to thousands of people all over the country. It is only when they
try to bankrupt us that we feel we should speak out. If our situation is
duplicated around the country, every father who has a daughter between the
ages of 4 and 12 is going to have to apply for relief.
"This is what happened:
"Our 7 year-old daughter requested, four months ago, a Barbie Doll. Now,
as far as we're concerned, one doll is just like another and, since the Barbie
Doll cost only $3.00, we were happy to oblige.
"We brought the doll home and thought nothing more of it until a week
later our daughter came in and said, 'Barbie needs a negligee.'
"'So does your mother,' we replied.
"'But there is one in the catalog for only $3.00,' she cried.
"'What catalog?'
"'The one that came with the doll.'
"We grabbed the catalog and, much to our horror, discovered what the
sellers of Barbie were up to. They'll let you have the doll for $3.00, but you
have to buy clothes for her at an average of $3.00 a crack. They have about
200 outfits, from ice-skating skirts to mink jackets, and a girl's status in the
community is based on how many Barbie clothes she has for her doll.
"The first time we took our daughter to the store we spent $3.00 on a
dress for her and $25 to outfit her Barbie Doll.
"A week later our daughter came in and said, 'Barbie wants to be an air-
line stewardess.'
"'So let her be an airline stewardess' we said.
"'She needs a uniform. It's only $3.50.'
"We gave her $3.50.
"'But I need $3.00 more because Barbie needs a dress to go out on a date
with the pilot after they're finished flying.'
"'Let her sit on the pilot's lap in her uniform,' we said angrily.
"Our wife gave us a bawling out and we forked over another $3.00.
"Barbie didn't stay a stewardess long. She decided she wanted to be a
nurse ($3.00), then a singer in a night club ($3.00), then a professional dancer( 3.00).
"One day our daughter walked in and said, 'Barbie's lonely.'
"'Let her join a sorority,' we said.
"'She wants Ken.'
"'Who is Ken?'
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self interest. The court commonly refers to the inventory as the prop-
erty used and useful in the public service. What is being used and what
should be held in readiness for substitution in case of temporary unit
failure and what should be allowed in a general reserve does not seem
to be so involved that a purpose to bargain in good faith by ordinary,
honest men would not determine.
XV
It was the casual expression by the Court in Smyti v. Ames that
the income should be equal to comparable risk that allows the possessory
entry for the expert. It must be kept in mind that the commission re-
tains continuing policing jurisdiction of the utility, and that is why it
was created. It prescribes the manner in which the company records
shall be kept. It exercises continuous audit, and can call at any time
for an explanation of any conduct. Every entry into the capital account
is under supervision. The whole, i.e., all the property and business of
the utility, has been developed in this supervision. This is the peculiar
jurisdiction or supervision of and the why for commissions which, in
reality, means that the utility does not have to "go to court," for the
simple reason that it always is "in court" with the commission. There
does not have to be a "formal" proceeding to give the commission juris-
diction for a "final" order. In Smyth v. Ames, there was nothing-no
records by either side that had any reliability-so that everything had
to be adduced at trial, after the manner of an automobile accident liti-
gation.
73
The purpose of this paper is to bridge from base74 to return, leaving
"She showed us the catalogue. Sure enough, there was a doll named Ken,
the same size as Barbie, with crew-cut hair, a vinyl plastic chest and moveable
arms and legs.
"'If you don't get Ken,' our daughter cried, 'Barbie will grow up to be
an old maid.'
"So we went out and bought Ken ($3.50). Ken needed a tuxedo ($5.00),
a raincoat ($2.50), a terrycloth robe and an electric razor ($2.00), tennis
togs ($3.00), pajamas ($1.50), and several single-breasted suits ($27.00).
"Pretty soon we had put up $400 to protect our original $3.00 investment.
"Then one evening our daughter came in with a shocker. 'Barbie and Ken
are getting married.'
"'Who's paying for the wedding?'
"Our daughter handed us the catalogue. 'Here's Barbie's wedding dress.
It's only $5.00.'
"'And what else?'
"'They'll need a house to live in. Here's Barbie's Dream House.'
"'Seven ninety-five?' we shouted. 'Why can't they live on a shelf like the
rest of your dolls.'
"The tears started to flow. 'They want to live together as man and wife.'
"Well, Barbie and Ken are now happily married and living in their Dream
House with $3,000 worth of clothes hanging in the closet. We wish we could
say that all was well, but yesterday our daughter announced that Midge($3.00), put out by the same toy firm, was coming to visit them. And she
doesn't have a thing to wear."
S3At the time of Symth v. Ames, there were no automobiles.
7' See Smith, The Reality of the Public Utility Rate Base, 67 DICK. L. REv. 83
(1962).
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the detailed analysis of the latter to another time. Here, inquiry in
process and method raises the question whether the present failure of
government is caused by its disability or its distraction. It should be
borne in mind that general commissions were common only after 1908.
Smyth v. Ames started in formal judicial chambers and had to wear
the vestments of that office. The only record of evidence possible had
to be manufactured on the spot and, by the tradition of the court room,
evidence was produced through testimony and interrogation. The issue
was constitutionality and the stakes were "winner take all," finally, at
the drop of the gavel. This image of grandeur makes it easier for the
expert to stage his stuff. Whatever may be said so well against the
television camera in the courtroom trial of crime, perhaps if the public
could have a glimpse of this seance of experts, it might boil off the
clouding vapor in the demonstration of the ridiculous. In comes the
entourage of experts, counsel, etc., and the witness "takes the stand"
and from that high vantage point gives forth his priestly blessing with
pontific finality of perfection. This liturgy is accomplished by responsive
reading through questions and answers prepared by the expert. A little
rehearsal allows each to seem both spontaneous and original, always
magnificent in learning and wisdom. The other team is not so well
positioned at this point. The show must go on and cross-examination
starts. There sits the lawyer, day after day after day, with his expert's
mouth glued to his ear giving the lawyer the questions to ask the other
expert. You see, expert witnesses cannot practice law so they cannot
ask questions, and lawyers should not be expected to understand this
stuff well enough to be able to conduct intelligent cross-examination.
(Exceptions prove the rule but even he must flatter his expert.) If I
can emancipate him, this will be the greatest contribution to the lawyer
since the Statute of Uses. Unless the lawyer is the master of his own
case, there is no due process of law.
That ought to be enough to call for soul searching.7 5 The typical
This -will index and briefly review the base. Shortly after the publication
of the base in the above article, a prominent authority wrote to me: "And I
think you are wrong when you say, 'the money the owner advanced and not
the generator' is the 'interest protected.' I built a house in [C City, State S]
for $28,000 in 1936 and sold it for $48,000 when we moved to [State X] in
1953. Do you think that I would have been satisfied with the mere restoration
of my $28,000 investment?" The following shows this error: The number of
dollars needed to purchase the same amount of goods in 1953 that could be
purchased for $28,000 in 1936 may be computed by first converting the 1936
All Commodities Wholesale Price Index to a 1953 base. To do this, divide the
1936 index value, 44.2 (1957-59=100), by the 1953 index value, 92.7. The re-
sulting figure, expressed as an index, is 47.68 (1963=100). Dividing $28,000
by 47.68 and moving the decimal point tvo places to the right, produces a value
of $58,724.83, the 1953 amount needed to equal the purchasing power of $28,000
in 1936 as measured by the Wholesale Price Index. His squib is a boomerang.
In reality, he is in support. His error exemplifies the fundamental flaw. The
difference is not the cause of prices. It is the consequence of prices.
See note 65 supra. When lawyers try cases that they do understand, are not
the facts often extremely complicated, but do they not have to settle the
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case never escapes this complicity. Remember that the commissioner
may never have had any training in the special field before him. How-
ever, with the expert witness so graciously summarizing and justifying
the testimony of his script, there really is not much need for it, as
surely the expert will have used his argot as an ankus with skill of
phrasing and tone of learning so that its integration into the opinion
must be recognized as widom and erudition. There is no question or
purpose here to question the integrity, good faith, or ability of the in-
dividual commissioner. After appointment, like the judge, other im-
perious demands of his docket increasingly lessen his time for this mas-
sive process. No degree or amount of diligence and good faith can give
him more than twenty-four hours in the day. The Morgan cases demon-
strate that the constantly multiplying number and variety of official
demands upon his time make him increasingly dependent upon his spe-
cial office staff and briefs of counsel in the case to digest and reduce
the tonnage of the record and the mysticism of the expert to some
measurable expression for publication as his opinion. Unless a judge
or a commissioner is the master of his own record, there can be no due
process of law. The reviewing judge has not even seen or heard the
proceedings which might have started while he was still in law school.
Somehow, the court 6 being caught at the end of this eight-year rain-
bow, will do what courts cannot and should not do-give a trial de novo
and make the rate.7 7 We must save face, and those in authority must
impress the hoi polloi that they know of what they are talking.
record for appeal? One must wonder what could not be done in good faith
bargaining on a record presented by the commission's tentative findings and
order with equivalent response prepared out of hearing and filed, with con-
ference whether pre-trial or trial on actual differences of importance.
See Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (1963),
for some discussion of Commission retention of case for correction and of
power to proceed to final order without formal hearing. Cf. LaRue v. Udall,
324 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1963); FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964);
and Massachusetts Trustees v. United States, 377 U.S. 235 (1964).
76 State v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 70; see Sherwin v. Welch,
319 F.2d 751, 755 (1st Cir. 1963), for a recent disposition on an expert record.
Where opposing teams of "experts" cancel-out each other on the merits, it
seems that the trier of facts, as in moot court cases, may elect the side which
best tells the story. This is more dignified than saying, "I'll flip you for it."
See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 373 U.S. 930 (1964), for
frowning comment on the mechanical adoption. In the present, dispositive
order practice, the commissioner acts under the pressure, excitement, and
confusion of the moment, guessing the roll into the future. Under continuingjurisdiction, he enjoys the calm of retrospection. Freed from the role of the
prophet, he can exercise his own full and deliberate judgment on the truth
of history. He can observe how his order worked. Remember, the record still
is open, in continuing jurisdiction, for receipt of the relevant and correction
of the errors. It will be an accounting of facts as distinguished from a pro-jection of fantasy: a few weeks over the accounting year to eliminate error
as distinguished from eight years trying to conceal and defend error.
77Ditto. Perhaps, it just got indigestion after chewing on the same inherent,
obvious error for eight years and cast up the decision itself: "the most specu-
lative undertaking imposed upon them in the entire history of English juris-
prudence." West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 689 (1935)
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Self-hypnotism would be uncalled for if there were conscious re-
alization by the commission of its continuing jurisdiction to reaudit for
correction whenever the vapor of confusion should blow away. By the
same token, the inclination to stuff the record would go with it."
xvI
What will bring rationalization to the computation of rates first
must inquire what elements shall have consideration. Costs to be charged
to rates may be internal or external. Some operating costs, like wages,7 9
have an overlap. There is no "return" until after outlay is reimbursed
from rates expressed as profit. We are dealing with a going concern.
There is nothing hypothetical in that. The failure of the record in San
Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jaspers ° and FPC v. Hope Natural Gas
Co.81 was due largely to the inclusion of so many claims that were not
compensable.8 2 Comparable risk was used by the Court to assure that
the result would be somewhere within limits of reason. This safety
device is not uncommon in court decision progress. Until we learn more,
we must get along on what we have. In the early infringement cases,
a comparative to patents employed in trade marks trials soon was aban-
doned for greater realism. Dependence upon imitation of others is a
confession of frustration and an act of desperation. Even the value
comparison in taxation is of little value to them and less to us. All
utilities are isomeric. Here, neither term is apropos. There is no risk,
other than just living in this world, and no occasion to prove by com-
parison. The market is exclusive and the rate is adjustable. How much
(dissenting opinion of Stone, J.). Here the apples also were carriers of some
extrinsic evil; i.e., dysentery.
This purpose of atonement in the function of reaudit of the operational
life of the rate order appears as the thesis of the Ambassador of the United
States pleading before the Security Council of the United Nations on the
Cyprus crisis for moratorium during which measures of corrective, healthful
adjustment might be taken in an atmosphere of reason, for otherwise "our
deliberations will not be inquiry. They will be autopsy." Associated Press, Aug.
8, 1964.
Insull's wisdom found greatness in his reputation for ability to know that
future utility profits would be favorable to investors. So, he earned their
trust and confidence. They looked back too late and the Depression was on.
78 "Second, and perhaps even more important, with unlimited access to all of
the Company's records, there is not yet the slightest indication that there
exists any separate records, papers, or documents which reflect the judgment
factors which led representatives of the Employer to put one particular job
in one, rather than in another, classification. True, reference was occasionally
made to it being 'scientific' and perhaps too difficult for the Union people to
understand. But it is plain from the whole record that these so-called point
values covering factors such as skill, etc., were just subtle factors of man-
agement judgment." NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963).
T9 The parties to the labor dispute in public service relations must find some
way among themselves to avoid disruption of service. See S. REP. No. 459,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), and 77 Stat. 132 (1963), 45 U.S.C. §157 (Supp.
V. 1959-63), resulting from the railroad work rules dispute. Surely, we have
matured enough to know that no one ever wins a fire.80 189 U.S. 439 (1903).
81320 U.S. 591 (1944).
82 Cf. notes 65 and 72 supra.
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someone else is eating does not prove it a healthy diet for another, even
if he is a relative. They are not the same and resemblance of the pre-
scription is pure chance. 3 The utility gets paid out of rates for all its
expenses, even income taxes. There always will be a fringe of limitation
of inclusion which may require judicial arbitration as a question of
law. 84 This study bridges between base and rates. It is integral and
interstitial. Rates will be analyzed later in terms of composition, con-
struction, and function. We may lay the launching structure here as
part of the process. The discussion of computation is the last chapter.
Obviously, the rate is expressed in current dollars, as the base is ex-
pressed in general dollars. What is important is the money involved.
In one sense, one does not own money as such. What he acquires in
dollars is power which is found in credit and buying power. In great
properties, this is kept functional in the flow of capital and becomes the
power of replacement in the market. The base must be the general dollar
or rates would be hitched to a dead horse. This means that return is
founded, for the utility rate, on the value of the use of money.
The value of that use or the rent, owed by the public, for the money
tied up in the going concern in turn goes back to the cost of money.
This cost of that money first is expressed in the interest which must be
paid for its acquisition. The interest is what it costs to buy money and
so equates itself with what it costs to buy the generator. It is not some-
one else's generator and it is not someone else's cost of money.
This gives us a source and foundation which have the two virtues
concerning us. The first is to escape conjury and the second is to find
certainty and be ascertainable without much cost to establish or delay
in doing. It is current, demonstrative, and reliable.8 5
83 Two professional teams play in New York. What the Yankees do in Los
Angeles is little evidence of what the Mets will do there.
The enjoyment of the "comparable sale" to help establish the fair market
value in a condemnation suit is not analogous. There, the old generator, in
propria persona, is being sold to a consumer who has free election and choice
to satisfy any inducement whim or seek a substitute.
See East Pennsylvania R.R. v. Heister, 40 Pa. 53 (1861) ; and United
States v. 585.87 Acres of Land, 210 F. Supp. 585 (D. Kan. 1962) ; cf. Annot.,
85 A.L.R. 2d 110, 173 (1962).
The only relevant comparison is the current competitive price or cost of
the use of money. Too much comparison might bring on the collusion in.
volved in the cases discussed by NEAL & GOLDBERG, op. cit. supra note 42.84Alabama Power Co. v. FPC, 304 F. 2d 29, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 924 (1962).
See also FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145 (1962) ; Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) ; North.
ern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963); and Wis-
consin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 309 (1963) : "It has been repeatedly stated that no
single method must be followed by the Commission in considering the just-
ness and reasonableness of rates."
These will include, i.e., among others, allocation questions on credit to
income for plant improvement and working capital.
85 See Smith, supra note 74, for awful cost of present method. Yes, this is a
land of opportunity, but it also is a land of plenty of poverty with too many
homes that omit some or all their food for breakfast on that difference which
it takes to "feed the meter."
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In all my studies, for examination, no matter which way they started
out, they always come to this same harbor.
The simple fact is that interest in America starts with the discount
rate expressed by the Federal Reserve System articulated through the
Treasury. That expresses the availability and the initial cost of money.
The discount rate is what the Federal Reserve charges member banks
to borrow funds, and this rate traditionally sets the pace for the banks'
charge to their customers. It moves through the member banks of the
Federal Reserve System and finds its departure expression in the
prime rate.8
The "discount" rate as applied to Treasury transactions is what the
United States pays for the use of money it borrows in the open market
from private capital through the sale of its long and short term se-
curities, while the "discount" rate of the Federal Reserve is what it
charges its member banks for their use of money borrowed from it.
Treasury discount is the index for rates of interest on private long and
short term securities. Federal Reserve discount is the basis upon which
its member banks determine the price of the use of money they charge
private individuals who borrow from them. The prime rate is what the
member banks of the Federal Reserve System charge their most credit-
worthy customers. Return upon utility shareholders' equity should start
with this minimum. The competition for money is so intense and the
subject matter is so fluid that the prime rate set by the great New
York banks, subject to some local color, practically establishes the
prime rate nation-wide through adoption or imitation.
These are ascertainable by anyone and known to the parties to any
valuable proceeding. 7 Both the base and this cost are current prices.
86 In the middle of the United States, these now in turn are three and one-half
per cent, and four and one-half percent. These rates are the foundation of
all financing. The market starts with the market yield on three-month Treas-
ury bills and on U.S. Government long-term bonds as typical of short-term
and long-term interest rates. See Money: What It Costs, Time, Sept. 11,
1964; and The Prime Rate, 44 MONTHLY REv., FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW
YORK 54, 70 (1964).
"On Monday morning, The Bank of England raised Britain's bank rate
from five to seven per cent. That afternoon [November 23, 1964] the Federal
Reserve System raised our discount rate from three and one-half to four
per cent. This was the first increase since July, 1963, when the Board raised
the basic lending rate to three and one-half from three per cent. When [No-
vember 27, 19641 the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank raised the discount
rate, the fee it charges member banks, to four per cent, effective November 30,
1964, all member banks had made the increase." Kansas City Times, Nov. 27,
1964. Atlanta's Citizen & Southern National Bank already had increased its
prime rate from four and one-half to four and three-quarters per cent. When
they pay four for what they sell for four and one-half, the banks' profit
spread is only one-half of one per cent less costs.
87 Specific data on interest rates may be obtained from the statistical table
appearing in the monthly Federal Reserve Bulletin, copies of which gen-
erally can be found in public libraries. The Bulletin also may be obtained
from the Board or the Government Printing Office at 60 cents per copy or
$6.00 for a year's subscription. General information on the subject of interest
rates is included in U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERE SYSTEM,
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Now, the compulsion to use the competence found in continuing juris-
diction becomes res ipsa loquitur5 It also eliminates the trended price
of the expert witness testimony, chasing the will of the wisp called re-
production new, because we just do not need a prophet. The reason the
prophet fails is that we just cannot know what of the present will prove
the future, and so we roll the ball.s9
All data will become a matter of record within the accounting pe-
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM-P URPOSES AND FUNCTION (1963), obtainable
from the same source or any local, member bank of the Federal Reserve
System.
See especially id. at 41 for a full discussion of the Federal Reserve's dis-
count rate which discloses that its discount rate is kept current by the United
States and that changes are announced publically through the press. They
also are communicated directly and specially to each of the member banks.
The Treasury Bulletin and the Federal Reserve Bulletin, published monthly,
contain several statistical series on market interest rates and security prices;
i.e., 1963 TREASURY BULL. 81 and 1963 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1108-09. The
Federal Reserve Chart Book shows bank interest rates, including the prime
rate, in nineteen major cities from 1956 to date. Publications of the Federal
Reserve System are listed in 1963-64 U.S. GOVT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 693
and publications of the Treasury are listed in id. at 681.
Searching and comparative analyses are published showing farm mortgage
interest rates by types of lenders, the weighted averages for the United
States by years, and the rate of return on capital invested in agriculture by
years. These appear in the AGRICULTURE FINANCE REV., Table 22 (Supp. Dec.
1962). The farm mortgage interest rate average for all lenders for 1962
was 5.1, and the return to capital used in agricultural production was 5.2.
See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, INFORMATION BULL. No. 281, BALANCE
SHEET OF AGRICULTURE 1963, Table 17 (1964). Figures for both series for
future years should be available from the Agricultural Finance Review. Pub-
lications of the Department of Agriculture are listed in 1963-64 U.S. GOVT.
ORGANIZATION MANUAL 683. Farm mortgage interest rates are considered in
computing the Consumer Price Index. See note 88 infra.
The Small Business Administration, which interprets its function as gen-
erally promotional, is confined between five and five and one-half percent
interest.
s Keep in mind that the return includes more than just bare bones cost of the
money.
While ours is a captive market and a regulated price, the comparison with
the free market profits always should be noticed: "Profit margins for manu-
facturing corporations in the first quarter of 1963 fell to 4.2 cents per dollar
of sales from 4.8 cents in the fourth quarter of 1962 and 4.3 cents in the first
quarter of last year. The rate of profit on shareholders' equity was 8.6 per-
cent in the first quarter of 1963 compared with 10.5 percent in the fourth
quarter and 9.0 percent in the first quarter of 1962. Companies with assets
under $50 million experienced a greater drop in profits than the larger com-
panies." FTC & SEC, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT FOR U.S. MANUFACTURING
CORPORATIONS, RELEASE No. 1909 (1st Quarter 1963). The Quarterly Financial
Report or U.S. Manufacturing Corporations, published jointly by the Federal
Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, is a search-
ing compilation and "income statement and balance sheet for all manufactur-
ing corporations." It is for sale by the Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington 25, D.C.., by subscription for $1.25 a year (Library of Congress Catalog
Card Number 49-45545).
Data pertaining to the return on invested capital can be obtained from the
Statistical Abstract of the United States, which shows selected financial items
for the largest industrial corporations by industry; i.e., page 493 of the 1963
edition.89 The first failure of prophets of profits is that no one can know the future-
if he could he would own the Earth.
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riod, and equatable therein under the continuing jurisdiction of the
commission.
Nothing is created by an accounting period. It is not time itself but
only a cleavage or period of time selected for convenience in counting
the eggs; i.e., for accounting. Neither is anything created by the initial
rate order other than the fact of its utterance-it will fix the charges
to be made at the start of the period. The great right of property is
not in the declaration of the order made at the beginning of the ac-
counting period. The great right is the actual receipt of the appropriate
return. It is a continuous right and incorporates the whole time con-
tinuously while the business of the utility is subjected to rate control
under the police power administered by the commission. The accounting
period is neither its beginning nor its ending. Obviously, the declaraton
of the order is only an estimate of income expected of the rate. Like
the strapless evening gown, it may be hoped that it will stay up but only
the passage of time will disclose what happens (it might need to be ad-
justed). No one supposes that his "declaration of estimated income"
will satisfy the collector of income taxes if his net profits double or
that he will be satisfied to let his prophecy stand if they halve 0
Two major charges to income are expressed in terms of depreci-
ation and working capital. These also only can be known after occur-
rence. Both are in current dollars. It seems that the absorption of de-
preciation must be a function of rates, not a measure of the base. Argu-
ment is strongly made with much persuasion that where cash is on hand
which has been paid by the consumer and anticipates simple operation
costs, it has doubtful place in working capital.9 It has merit, but only
90 Back-handedly and with its own intrinsic merit, there is being applied a na-
tional recognition of this necessity to wait for time in the Renegotiation
Act, as amended, 76 Stat. 134 (1962), and in the Procurement Act, 76 Stat.
528 (1962). The committee report on the former says: "The Renegotiation
Act of 1951, which authorizes the Government to recapture excessive profits
on certain Government contracts ... is scheduled to expire... ." S. REP. No.
1669, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). The latter does about the same through
the terms of the contract, and speaks of eight per cent, plus incentive, etc.,
allowances. Both of these are contractural. Our problem is the operation of
original equity jurisdiction under the police power. See 76 Stat. 648 (1962),
amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §172, to provide a seven-year net operating
loss carryover for certain regulated transportation corporations.
Technical accounting analysis will come later. Here, there is no contest
with the accountant. Presently, all I ask is the narrative, leaving to the techni-
cian the form or device of disclosure. It is enough here to recognize that in
doing so the method, form, or practice is not the objective and that the ac-
counting practice is not immutable. Space Controls, Inc. v. Commissioner, 322
F.2d 144, 149 (5th Cir. 1963). Loosely, for example by analogy, I do not care
whether the technical form might be debt, detinue, trover, or replevin as
the essence is: You have my property. Either give it back or pay me for it.
I am asking for only a nominal adjustment of the practice to insure the in-
tegrity of the process. .
91 The initial charge to capital account of our generator should remain un-
depreciated until displacement, then withdrawn in whole, substituting the
cost of the replacement at that time. The depreciation on separate units would
be computed separately but associated to establish a plant mortality experi-
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to the amount and not the account. It helps to measure the amount.
It does not describe the account. The confusion: arises from proximity,
but the title is not fungible. Even when he only loans, the recipient
owns. Here, there is sale with payment after performance and con-
sumption. All funds employed in the function of the going concern
are a part of the base. The heat of the consumer's hand does not dis-
guise the ownership of the funds by the utility. For the purpose of
rates, it is raised capital.
What is essential to these enormous properties is that, despite com-
mission rate-making power, they continue in private ownership and
ence and a charge made to income large enough to retire the separate units
at the time of retirement. This charge to income should be held in a retirement
reserve fund and in this manner establish a funding of the plant retirement.
A relationship with working capital would be for consideration. The salvage
value of the old unit at the time of its retirement may be credited to the re-
tirement reserve fund.
The accounting regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission con-
tain rules providing for establishing estimated salvage values prior to estab-
lishing a rate of depreciation, and they also contain provisions for disposing of
the gain or loss resulting at time of retirement. The accounting regulations
of the Interstate Commerce Commission require that the service value of
depreciable property be written-off through equal periodic charges to operating
expenses over the service life of the property with current credits to the de-
preciation reserve account.
The accounting regulations of the Federal Communications Commission
stem from the studies of the Interstate Commerce Commission and parallel
its regulations. My retirement reserve fund and a funding of plant retirement
refer to the provision of depreciation through a reserve or allowance ac-
count and relate to an estimate of the average service life of each type
of unit or group of units. Thus, my plan outlines, in general overall, the
accounting prescribed in their systems of accounts. The purpose is to con-
form within a working difference of detail to more certainly identify the
base. This evolves from the base article, Smith, supra note 74, to allow vital,
current dollars rather than moaning, rusty generators to describe the capital
account to record empounded money. The service life quarterbacks the line
and calls the shift in entry upon a major unit withdrawal. The salvage value
probably is a current price. Under the FCC accounting regulations, either
the amount to be accrued each year as a charge to expense and a credit
to the depreciation reserve is computed by subtracting the estimated net sal-
vage (salvage less cost of removal) from the book cost of the unit and divid-
ing the resulting amount by the estimated service life; or, as applied to the
large telephone companies, depreciation charges are accrued on the basis of
the cost of all property included in each class or subclass of depreciable
plant using the average service life thereof properly weighted by the in-
vestment in that class. Upon the retirement of any depreciable property, its
full service value is charged to the depreciation reserve whether or not the
particular item has attained the average service of life. Under the group
plan no loss or gain is recognized upon retirement of plant. I have allowed
salvage as a credit to the reserve only to associate it with the function of rates
to liquidate the accrued debt.
Cash flow, the sum of depreciation charges, and net profits after taxes
would not be materially affected. For discussion of the trend to liberalized
accounting, see ABA Utility Section Newsletter, Oct. 1, 1963, p. 6. See also
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, PUBLIC UTIrITY LAW (1963), reprinting the addresses
delivered at the Chicago meeting of August 12-14, 1963. In the argument be-
fore the Federal Power Commission on accounting for tax credit, just about
every variety of opinion on how investment credit should be accounted for
on the books of public utilities was expressed at the FPC hearing on October
7, 1963. Those favoring flow through and those favoring full normalization
were about equally divided. The staff of the FPC supported flow through.
Cf. Note, Liberalized Depreciation, 50 VA. L. Ray. 298 (1964).
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that management must be vital and intelligent. Unless there is enough
certainty to not only allow but to invite managerial skill in long-term
planning, there can be only an unsatisfactory public service. The two
remaining primary factors to be charged to rates are the allowance in
addition to the cost of money enough to assure that the best service is
well paid for, expressed in terms of incentive or compensation for the
value of the managerial skill; and if doubt remains that the investment
is attractive, then provision therefore. 92 The prime rate is the founda-
tion upon which these various additional factors are to be added. This
will provide the return upon the unappropriated proprietary proportion
or shareholders' equity.
The disclosure of the cost of money by the national discount rate
is as sound and constant as the United States. It is common knowledge
through frequent official publications of the United States and con-
stitutes the best evidence and the greatest trust and confidence that can
be found for us. It is free from partisan preparation. If it does not
continue, all this will not make any difference anyhow.
93
92 See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 81. Mention there of "share-
holder's equity" has become a major area of discussion. Fundamentally, it
is a proprietary proportion. Contract obligations, such as bonds' interest,
state their own claims or charges to rates. It is the unapportioned invest-
ment or property that must be hospitable to new money to assure credit.
Members of the New York Stock Exchange use "equity" in such phrases
as "the decline of equity prices" and "shareholders' equity." In the former,
the word "equity" is synonymous with "stock", .or more correctly, "common
stock". Thus, the phrase could read "decline in stock prices" or 'decline in
prices of common stocks." In the latter, "equity" refers to shareholders'
equity or book value per share. The book value (or shareholder's equity)
per share of common stock is found by adding up all the assets generally
excluding intangibles, subtracting all liabilities and stock issues ahead of the
common, and then dividing by the number of common shares.
I have used proprietary proportion as interchangeable with their "equity
ownership" or, in their use, more specifically, "equity per share." It seems
harmonious.
The terms stockholders' equity, equity capital, net worth, net assets, and
total equity often are used interchangeably in the publications of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission.
For the Securities and Exchange Commission, "book value" merely means
"net assets" or "stockholders' equity." When the question is directed at de-
termining what is "true book value" or book value based upon a value
balance sheet, then, in financial statements filed under the various acts, other
than the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Commission accepts only
balance sheets based on historical cost, with limited exceptions. Under the
1940 act, open-end companies are required to reflect assets at value showing
cost parenthetically and closed-end companies may reflect assets at value
showing cost parenthetically. See SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. §§210.6-02(f) (1),
(2) (1964). The term "value" is defined in section 2 (a) (39) of the 1940
act. This definition states that with respect to securities for which market
quotations are readily available they shall be valued at quoted market value
and, with respect to other securities and assets, fair value as determined in
good faith by the board of directors. The Commission has not to date prom-
ulgated any rule with respect to the calculation of net asset value of invest-
ment companies other than the extent to which the rules in article 6 of
regulation S-X have a bearing on such calculations.
93 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), to the effect
that even contracts protected by constitutional certainty are no good unless
the government continues ready and able to protect their comparative value.
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The night before the Argonne, a young man I knew banked a rou-
lette game. It gave him courage, as, by morning, he had nothing left
to lose but his life. Having paid it for the preservation of sound gov-
ernmental practice, it seen-s to me we should consider anew what we
are doing before it is too late-eight years only to get ready a case
for the trial of the federal question . 4 I really am not so much con-
cerned about him. Perhaps, he could have kept his head down. What
seems important is that our trusteeship should be administered so that
"our Posterity" can hold their heads up.95
This permits us to close on a happy vein of confidence for both our-
selves and our posterity, as the solution is self contained in the vital
process we received from the centuries of proofing to accomplish fair-
ness in a complete remedy. The chancellor's special power to equate
and remove inequities surely was not conceived to compound them by
its own process. It was for their removal that the power was born to
free government. This is why continuing jurisdiction is a part of the
principle of and inherent in equity. Even if it were not of itself the
congenital character of equity, it is vested there by the legislative grant,
admonished in Brimson as a matter involving the public right, pre-
sented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting upon
it, and susceptible of judicial determination. For us here, the doctrine
of continuing jurisdiction is a built-in security demanding articulation
to the prompt solution by abatement of what has been permitted to
become distended as a gigantic public nuisance fed by a spurious theory
of hypothetical and artificial evidence of the value of the use of money
in the market place.
Every major element of the present plant has origin, one way or
another, under the vicarious, obstetrical observation of the commission
and has known cost on a tested record. The problem of comparison
94 State v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 70.
95 Cf. cases and authorities cited notes 36, 63, and 64 supra. Most cases aspire to
and many approach the squander of time and cost of State v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 70. See Long, supra note 71.
The sequence in the case cited in Smith, supra note 74, at 97 n. 29, ap-
pears in the decision of the supreme court of the state on November 2, 1963,
in which it reversed the district court which had reversed the Commission.
The case now is ready to start all over again. The spokesman for the utility
is quoted as saying that the utility "hopes to present data for new rates much
as if it were a new case. Three years have gone by. There have been many
changes including at least three wage increases and greatly increased in-
vestment since the rate order. The case will go back to the Commission.
They'll have to determine two things. What rates should be applied to the
future (1964) and what the rates should have been in each of those years."
Topeka State Journal, November 2, 1963. The Commission issued the order
appealed in May 1959. The case now is reported as Southwestern Bell Co.
v. State Corp. Comm'n, 192 Kan. 39, 386 P.2d 515 (1963), and hearing
for reconsideration is under way.
With the incentive contract coming forward as the index of low-cost ef-
ficiency in the nation's purchasing, public policy (see Time, Oct. 25, 1963, p. 95)
invites appraisal to promote "honest, efficient, and economical" management
reward.
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is the current one of competition of lenders for the price of the use
of their money by the borrowing utility, or of new "proprietors" if
the utility seeks additional capital through expanding equity. These are
contemporary, ascertainable markets, personal to the utility involved.
We already have within ourselves a simple and effective process
which has before it a reliable and demonstrable, stable standard by
which to equate the value of the use of captive capital with the com-
petitive market and to retain within itself the magnetism for new money.
Herein is the stability which must be found to permit the skill in judg-
ment for the long-range planning essential in these great industries in
the public service. The reward for this skill and initiative of manage-
ment, like the compensation for the use of its capital, likewise must be
equated with the competitive market. These are the measure of the
highest degree of public service under honest, efficient, and economical
management in the public interest in this government-industry complex
generalized as public utility regulation.
